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Explosion in the Granary 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was like 
one of  those random sparks that set off  violent 
explosions in grain elevators, for it led to 
counteractions that could unsettle world 
markets for years to come. Among other 
things, the President embargoed shipments of 
17 million tons of food and feedstuffs-
everything that had been scheduled for 
shipment this year above the basic 8 million 
tons specified in the u.s.-U.s.s.R. trade 
, agreement. As a result, many analysts are 
now predicting a decline of 10 percent or 
more in U.S. farm income this year, despite 
several measures which should cushion the 
blow-including $2.5 billion in higher 
crop-loan payments, and perhaps 
considerably more if  crop-reduction 
payments are added to the package. 
Nonetheless, the U.s. remains the key 
supplier in the world agricultural market, 
with its $32.0 billion offood and fiber exports 
in the latest (1978-79) crop year. Much of its 
pre-eminence has been achieved in the past 
decade, but that export performance has 
been accompanied by the appearance of  a 
very volatile purchaser, the Soviet Union, on 
the other side of  the market. 
Postwar development 
The U.S. (with Canada) has emerged as the 
world's breadbasket only since World War II, 
in terms of net grain-trade flows between 
regions. (Grain data provide a useful 
indicator of food trends, since grains supply 
more than half  of the world's food energy 
supply when consumed directly, and a 
sizable portion of  the remainder when 
consumed indirectly as meat and dairy 
products.) The shift is dramatic; during the 
1930's, all geographic regions except 
Western Europe were net exporters, but now 
qnly the North American countries (and 
occasionally Australia) are major factors on 
the supply side of  the market. Countries such 
as Brazil, Argentina, Thailand and 
(potentially) the Sudan are increasingly 
important, but the two North American 
countriesare likely to remain the dominant 
suppliers for some time to come. 
Accelerated population growth in many 
areas has accounted for both the upsurge in 
demand and the reshaping of world trade 
patterns. For example, North America and 
Latin America both had about the same 
population in 1950, but Latin America's 
population then grew explosively over the 
next quarter-century, so that it i? now more 
than 100 million largerthan North 
America's. The same pattern elsewhere has 
created deficit trade positions and heavy 
pressures on North America's grain supplies. 
Add to that the fickle weather patterns of  the 
1970's-combined with the U.S.S.R.'s 
decision during that decade to upgrade 
domestic consumption patterns through 
mammoth feed purchases overseas-and 
you have the ingredients for a rapidly 
expanding yet very volatile market for U.S. 
(and Canadian) farm products. 
U.S. dominance 
In the 1979 crop year alone, the U.S. 
exported a record $32.0 billion in farm 
products-up 17 percent over the previous 
year's figure (see chart). Export volume of 
137.5 million metric tons also set a new 
record-up 4 percent despite several major 
strikes which disrupted transportation 
patterns during the year. The nation's 
agricultural-trade surplus reached 
$15.8 billion last year, offsetting a 
considerable part of  the red ink generated by 
petroleum imports. In this as in other recent 
years, the U.S. exported the production of 
one out of  every three harvested acres. Over 
the past decade, the U.s. exported more than 
one-fourth of its corn crop, one-third of its 
cotton, more than one-half of its wheat and 
soybeans, and two-thirds of  its rice produc-
tion. Soybeans and feedgrains have shown 
the most spectacular grm·vth, accounting for 
one-half of  the total growth in exports 
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Moreover, the U.S. consistently accounts for 
a much larger portion of world agricultural 
trade than it does of world agricultural 
production. The U.s. generally accounts for 
more than half the world's trade in coarse 
grains and soybeans, while producing only 
one-third to two-fifths ofthose products. Also, 
it accounts for two-fifths of total cotton and 
wheat trade, but only one-sixth of world 
production, and it accounts for roughly 
one-fourth ofthe rice trade but only 2 percent 
of  world output. 
The competition 
Despite U.S. dominance in the world market, 
competition is becoming more vigorous and 
more widespread. Some traditional 
competitors-Canada, Australia and 
Argentina-are increasing their efforts in the 
world grain trade. In addition, Brazilian 
soybeans, Malaysian palm oil, Thai rice and 
corn, Pakistani cotton, and other new 
products now have gained a foothold in 
competition with American products. 
Government policy in all of these countries 
has encouraged more production and trade 
for export, as a means of paying soaring bills 
for imported oil. 
For decades, our  traditional competitors have 
imposed government restrictions on the grain 
trade through the mechanism of national 
marketing boards. These boards typically 
provide price guarantees, set limits on prices 
paid to farmers, and subsidize exports when 
supplies are large. This approach creates 
problems for the U.S., the residual supplier 
for world markets, because foreign 
purchasers buy American products only after 
less expensive subsidized supplies are 
exhausted. This makes the U.S. the prime 
adjuster of  production and stocks in response 
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to changing market conditions. On the other 
hand, the U.S. as the residual supplier 
frequently can obtain better prices than the 
subsidizing suppliers. 
Several developing nations have begun to eat 
into U.S. market shares through strong efforts 
devoted to production for export. The prime 
example is Brazil, which was once a two 
cash-crop exporter (coffee and sugar) but is 
now a multi-crop food exporter. In particular, 
Brazil has boosted its soybean output more 
than twelve-fold in less than a decade-with 
some help from Japan, which sought out new 
supply sources after being hit by the U.S. 
1973 embargo:on soybean shipments. In 
addition to ranking as the world's second 
largest soybean exporter, Brazil is also 
exporting corn and cotton, and is nearing 
self-sufficiency in wheat. 
Yet despite the Brazilian success, and the 
more limited successes of some other 
developing countries, the transition from a 
food-deficitto a food-surplus situation can be 
quite difficult. In a 1978 analysis of  export 
prospects, the u.s. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) commented, J1Even in 
areas where land and climate are suitable for 
efficient agricultural production, great 
cultural, economic and political obstacles 
often remain. Many countries are restricted 
by traditional land-tenure systems and 
cultural practices, lack of  marketing facilities".," 
and cheap-food policies for urban areas."  . 
Indeed, few if  any areas can match the 
combination of climate, soils, and 
socio-economic conditions that have created 
the phenomenal record of  achievement of  the 
American Heartland. 
The customers 
Larger and more affluent populations 
throughout the world have become prime 
customers for American and other 
agricultural exporters. The prime customers 
are the industrialized countries of Western 
Europe and Japan. The European 
Community, although close to self-
sufficiency in food grains, has had to import $  Billions 
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increasing quantities of feed grains and 
protein to satisfy its rapidly growing demand 
for livestock products. Japan similarly has 
boosted its demand for meat and for feed 
imports to produce it, as a new and more 
affluent generation has shifted its preference 
in favor of Western-style diets. 
Among the developing nations, India has 
grown from a majorfood-aid recipient during 
the 1960'  s to a major  commercial importer of 
U.S. grains in the 1970's. Also, the OPEC 
nations are spending a large share of their 
rising foreign-exchange earnings on food 
Imports-mainly animals, animal products, 
feedgrains and oilseeds. Most of the OPEC 
nations have limited productive capacity for 
agriculture. With thejr sharply increasing 
incomes from oil exports, their demand for 
meat and for U.S. animal and feed products is 
sharply expanding. 
Still, obstacles exist to U.s. sales in many of 
these markets. The European Community has 
its Common Agricultural Policy, which 
subjects grain i,mports to levies and duties, as 
a means of protecting the incomes of 
domestic producers. Japan has her memories 
ofthe U.S. 1973 soybean-export embargo, 
which has led her to seek out additional 
sources of oilseed and feed supplies, such as 
Brazil. India recently has benefitted from 
favorable monsoons and rising crop yields, 
which has enabled her to build up grain 
stocks and even export some supplies. And 
the Iranian Revolution has demonstrated that 
potential OPEC food demand can disappear 
for non-economic reasons. 
Sporadic customers 
The I  argest question mark su rrou nds what  the 
USDA calls "sporadic markets"  - the Soviet 
Union and the People's Republic of China. 
Government efforts to upgrade consumer 
living standards have boosted potential 
importdemand in both countries. Atthe same 
time, erratic climatic and production 
conditions-and above all, the political basis 
of  their market decisions-have destabilized 




The Soviet Union ranks as our most erratic 
market. The fluctuation of Soviet purchases 
has caused wide price variations-indeed, 
has been the most destabilizing factor on the 
world grain market over the past decade. 
Thus, considerable volatility is now likely, 
considering the massive size of  the trade that 
had originally been projected for the current 
(1979-80) crop year. The U.S.S.R. had been 
expected to import more than 32 million tons 
of  grain, with the u.s. supplying over' 
two-thirds of  that amount. This would have 
represented about one-fifth of  total U.S. grain 
exports, with a value of about $3  billion. 
The U.S.s.R.'s grain-import requirements 
reflect the failure of  Soviet agriculture to 
provide enough feed grains to expand its 
livestock base at needed levels. Also, the 
I  ivestock sector has fai led to improve its 
feed-conversion performance over time, and 
this has made additional livestock production 
costlier than planned. Now, since it cannot 
count on the U.S. supplying more than 
one-tenth of its total grain supplies, as 
originally planned, the Soviet Union will be 
forced to liquidate substantial animal 
inventories and severely curtail its 
livestock-production goals. Even in the best 
of  circumstances, recovery would be slow, 
considering that the U.S.S.R. took three years 
to rebuild its hog inventories following the 
drought-caused crop failure of 1975. With 
the severe cutback in U.S. supplies, this year, 
the Soviets will be hampered even more in 
meeting their objective of higher meat 
production. But Soviet shortages will be 
matched by U.S. surpluses, thereby 
emphasizing the problems of  the u.s. as the 
residual supplier in world markets. 
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BANKING DATA-TWELfTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and Liabilities 
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Change from 
yearago@ 
Dollar  Percent 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments*  137,236  - 597  +  16,348  +  13.50 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total# 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
(Large negotiable CD's) 
Weekly Averages 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (+  )/Deficiency (  - ) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (  + )/Net borrowed( -) 
Federal Funds - Sev~  Large Banks 
Net interbank transactions 
[Purchases (+  )/Sales (:.....)] 
Net, U.s. Securities dealer transactions 
[Loans (+)/Borrowings (-)] 
* Excludes trading account securities. 





















535  +  15,709  +  15.90 
- 339  +  4,359  +  15.20 
+  113  +  8,545  +  24.40 
+  5  +  4,568  +  22.80 
- 75  - 220  - 13.00 
54  - 528  - 6.90 
- 8  +  1,223  +  8.50 
-3,533  +  4,061  +  9.50 
-1,549  +  2,394  +  7.50 
- 42  1,491  4.90 
+  757  +  7,912  +  15.50 
+  659  +  8,644  +  20.80 
+  255  +  1,991  +  10.00 
Weekended  Comparable 
1/2/80  year-ago period 
12  43 
177  25 
- 189  68 
+  619  +1,180 
-1,201  +  729 
@ Historical data are not strictly comparable due to changes in the reporting panel; however, adjustments 
have been applied to 1978 data to remove as much as possible the effects of the changes in coverage. In 
addition, for some items, historical data are not available due to definitional changes. 
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